This document describes how to specify EdDSA keys and signatures in DNS Security (DNSSEC). It uses the Edwards-curve Digital Security Algorithm (EdDSA) with the choice of two curves, Ed25519 and Ed448.
Introduction
DNSSEC, which is broadly defined in [RFC4033] , [RFC4034] , and [RFC4035] , uses cryptographic keys and digital signatures to provide authentication of DNS data. Currently, the most popular signature algorithm in use is RSA. GOST ([RFC5933]) and NIST-specified elliptic curve cryptography ( [RFC6605] ) are also standardized.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa] describes the elliptic curve signature system EdDSA and recommends two curves, Ed25519 and Ed448. This document defines the use of DNSSEC's DS, DNSKEY, and RRSIG resource records (RRs) with a new signing algorithm, Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) using a choice of two instances: Ed25519 and Ed448.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] .
DNSKEY Resource Records
An Ed25519 public key consists of a 32-octet value, which is encoded into the Public Key field of a DNSKEY resource record as a simple bit string. The generation of a public key is defined in Section 5.1.5 in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa].
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An Ed448 public key consists of a 57-octet value, which is encoded into the Public Key field of a DNSKEY resource record as a simple bit string. The generation of a public key is defined in Section 5.2.5 in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa].
RRSIG Resource Records
An Ed25519 signature consists of a 64-octet value, which is encoded into the Signature field of an RRSIG resource record as a simple bit string. The Ed25519 signature algorithm is described in Section 5.1.6 and verification of the Ed25519 signature is described in Section 5.1.7 in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa].
An Ed448 signature consists of a 114-octet value, which is encoded into the Signature field of an RRSIG resource record as a simple bit string. The Ed448 signature algorithm is described in Section 5.2.6 and verification of the Ed448 signature is described in Section 5.2.7 in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa].
Algorithm Number for DS, DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records
The algorithm number associated with the use of Ed25519 in DS, DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records is TBD1. The algorithm number associated with the use of Ed448 in DS, DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records is TBD2. This registration is fully defined in the IANA Considerations section. Some of the material in this document is copied liberally from [RFC6605] .
The authors of this document wish to thank Jan Vcelak, Pieter Lexis, Kees Monshouwer, Simon Josefsson, Paul Hoffman and others for a review of this document.
IANA Considerations
This document updates the IANA registry "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Algorithm Numbers". The following entries have been added to the registry:
* There has been no determination of standardization of the use of this algorithm with Transaction Security.
Security Considerations
The security considerations of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa] and [RFC7748] are inherited in the usage of Ed25519 and Ed448 in DNSSEC.
Ed25519 is intended to operate at around the 128-bit security level, and Ed448 at around the 224-bit security level. A sufficiently large quantum computer would be able to break both. Reasonable projections of the abilities of classical computers conclude that Ed25519 is perfectly safe. Ed448 is provided for those applications with relaxed performance requirements and where there is a desire to hedge against analytical attacks on elliptic curves.
These assessments could, of course, change in the future if new attacks that work better than the ones known today are found.
A private key used for a DNSSEC zone MUST NOT be used for any other purpose than for that zone. Otherwise cross-protocol or crossapplication attacks are possible.
